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Abstract
Due to economic and demographic changes highly educated women
play an important role on the Chinese labour market. Gender has been
shown to be an important characteristic that influences behaviour in eco-
nomic experiments, as have, to a lesser degree, academic major, age and
income. We provide a study looking at trust and reciprocity and their
determinants in a labour market laboratory experiment. Our experimen-
tal data is based on two games, the Gift Exchange Game (GEG) and a
variant of this game (the Wage Promising Game, WPG) where the em-
ployer’s wage offer is non-binding and the employer can choose the wage
freely after observing the workers effort. We find that women are less
trusting and reciprocal than men in the GEG while this cannot be found
in the WPG. Letting participants play the GEG and the WPG, allows us
to disentangle reciprocal and risk attitudes. While in the employer role,
it seems to be that risk attitude is the main factor, this is not confirmed
analysing decisions in the worker role.
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1 Introduction
The one child policy in China has two consequences for the labour market. On
the one hand there is a shortage of skilled or educated labour, one the other
hand, the importance of women in the educated labour force increased dra-
matically (Zhang et al., 2012). Gender differences in behaviour observed in
economic experiments have been studied in many experimental games. Croson
and Gneezy (2009) provide a recent comprehensive survey of results of these ex-
periments. Other aspects that have been related to differences in behaviour is
the academic major of participants in experiments and their age. In this paper
we address these issues using Chinese subjects in an experimental labour mar-
ket. While it is interesting to see whether experimental results using Chinese
subjects are the same as those in the existing literature (that mainly builds on
experimental findings from Western countries), China’s recent economic growth,
in particular with respect to a changing labour market, makes this an important
question in itself: China’s development is characterised by an increase in the
importance of highly educated labour as well as an increase of female labour
force participation in this segment (Zhang et al., 2012). Furthermore, the im-
portance of Business graduates in the labour force is increasing as the economy
has changed from an engineering-based planned regime to a market-oriented one
with a significant services sector. One reason to think that Chinese employees
may behave different is that the one-child policy may not only have changed the
composition of the educated labour force - as parental investments are forced
to focussed on the single child independent of its gender, while before the intro-
duction parents could choose to investments primarily in males but also affect
the behaviour on an individual level. If differences in behaviour based on char-
acteristics such as gender and academic major do exist, policy makers as well
as company managers may want to take these factors into account.
In this paper we implement an experimental labour market in which partici-
pants interact in the roles of employers and workers based on the Gift Exchange
Game (GEG, Fehr et al., 1993) and a variant thereof, the Wage Promising
Game (WPG). The latter game changes the role of trustors (the employer in
the GEG) and trustees (the worker in the GEG) by starting with a non-binding
wage promise by the employer, followed by an effort decision by the worker and
then an unrestricted wage determination by the employer. These two games can
be seen a simplified archetypes of labour market interactions between employers
and workers. Furthermore, the two games allow us to disentangle reciprocity
or pro-social motives and risk attitude in determining behaviour. Participants
kept their role (as employers or workers), but played both games, while varying
the order of the games over sessions.
In our study, which uses decisions of 216 participants (40% female, average
age 20.63) who study in economics-based (112) and technical or engineering-
based (104) degrees. Divergent from much of the literature we find that women
are less trusting and that this finding is driven by lower willingness to recipro-
cate, and not necessarily by risk attitudes. The students with economics and
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business majors seem to be less trusting and less willing to reciprocate at first
impression, but this effect is likely due to the gender composition of students of
these majors. In our subject pool 62.5% of economics and business majors are
female, while of the engineering students only 15.4% are female. Controlling for
major and gender jointly renders academic major insignificant.
We also investigate other characteristics of participants that have been iden-
tified as variables influencing behaviour in experiments, i.e., age, employment
status and income. Our results confirm the results from existing research and
replicate them in a Chinese context, although our age effect seems to be quan-
titatively stronger than usually found in other studies that use a relatively ho-
mogeneous student population.
2 Related literature
Gender is probably the best studied determinant of decisions in economic exper-
iments. Eckel and Grossman (2008) and Croson and Gneezy (2009) summarise
most experimental evidence of gender differences in behaviour in risk and social
preferences. Both conclude that differences between the decisions of men and
women are observable in some cases while not in others. A mixed picture, with
no or vanishing statistical differences based on gender can particularly be found
in social preferences, which various experiments have studied. Ortmann and
Tichy (1999) look at cooperation between individuals in dictator games and ob-
serve higher cooperativeness of women, although initial differences vanish over
time of the experiment. Croson and Buchan (1999), Chaudhuri and Gangad-
haran (2007), Buchan et al. (2008) and Garbarino and Slonim (2009) study
gender differences in trust, finding a tendency of lower trust by women, and a
higher willingness to reciprocate, but the picture is not always the same across
studies. Cox and Deck (2007) and Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001) further look
at gender differences in altruism, finding that whether men or women are more
altruistic is dependent on the cost or price of altruism, with men being more
responsive to changes in prices and costs. Croson and Gneezy (2009) summarise
much of this and other literature, concluding that there are differences between
men and women in terms of risk attitudes, with women being more risk averse
then men, and that social preferences are more context-dependent for women
than for men. They also conclude that men are more willing to compete than
women.
Furthermore, other determinants of decisions have been studied in exper-
iments, although not being reflected in the literature to a similar degree as
gender. Age, one other demographic factor has been investigated in a number
of studies, mainly looking at risk attitudes (e.g. Harbaugh et al., 2002) and social
preferences (e.g., altruism (Martinsson et al., 2011), trust and trustworthiness
(Sutter and Kocher, 2007) and cooperative behaviour (Charness and Villeval,
2009)). These studies mostly investigate social preferences between different age
groups, mainly finding that pro-social behaviour increases with age, but that
these changes are relatively gradual effects, with differences observable between
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cohorts or generations rather than within relatively homogeneous age groups.
Another variable linked to pro-social behaviour that has been discussed in
the literature is academic major.1 Marwell and Ames (1981) observed over a
series of experiments that economists are often more selfish than others. Carter
and Irons (1991) and Frank et al. (1993) also found that students in economics
majors are more selfish, and that this effect is potentially further strengthened
over the length of studying. Dasgupta and Menon (2011) come up with similar
results in a more recent study, showing that economics majors are less reciprocal
than others.
In our study we include these 3 potential variables linked to pro-social de-
cisions, that is, academic major, gender and age (the last although our experi-
mental participants are all in the same cohort). We also consider other variables
potentially important for decisions in our experiment. We include income as a
proxy for the socio-economic background of our participants as the (ranking in)
income of our student subjects is mainly based on received transfers. Further-
more, we consider their job experience (i.e. whether participants currently have
a job or not) to reflect that our experiment is framed in an experimental labour
market and as prior research has found that individuals more experiences in
work environments tend to be more cooperative than undergraduates without
work experience in such a framework (Hannan et al., 2002).
We hypothesise that the determinants found in previous studies have effects
in our experimental labour market as well. However, we are aware that decision
patterns of students in China might be different from those found elsewhere, as
cultural factors might be different in China. Bu and McKeen (2001) provide
evidence that social behaviour may be different in China, especially in working
environments, in a study comparing questionnaire answers about work attitudes
of Canadian and Chinese business students. Wang and Yamagishi (2005) also
found Chinese women to be less trusting when engaging in social relationships
which require counterparts to be reciprocal. We therefore hypothesise women
to be less trusting than men in our experiment, while recognising that gender
differences might be context-dependent.
With regard to other factors we hypothesise older participants to be more
trusting and reciprocal based on findings of the studies described above, but not
necessarily in a significant way, given the small age range of our participants.
We also expect job status and higher income to be positively related to trust
and reciprocity levels, due to experienced mutually beneficial reciprocity on the
job and due to a greater ability to be generous with rising income, respectively.
3 Experimental design and implementation
For our experiment we used the gift exchange game (GEG) as introduced by
Fehr et al. (1993) and the wage promising game (WPG), an adaptation of the
1The potential causal relationship of academic major is not the same as for gender and
age, as it is selected by the students and potentially further influenced by what is learned over
the course of studying.
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GEG as described further below. We use these two games also in Dulleck et al.
(2012), with a subject pool of household aids (ayis) studying discrimination in
labour markets. This paper provides a more detailed discussion of the two games
and the relationship of the WPG to other, similar games in the literature.2 In
the two games participants are assigned the roles of employers and workers and
interact in (stylised) labour market relationships. In both games the employer
first makes a transfer (called the wage offer) between 5 and 100 experimental
dollars (in steps of 5), which is communicated to the worker and which the
worker can accept or reject. If the worker rejects, the game ends and both the
employer and the worker receive an outside option of 60 experimental dollars.
If the worker accepts, he or she has to choose a return transfer (called the level
of effort) between 1 and 10 (in steps of one). In the GEG the game ends at this
point and both players get paid based on the payoff function (see below). In the
WPG the effort is observed by the employer who can consequently determine the
final wage paid, which is again a back-transfer between 5 and 100 experimental
dollars and represents the realised wage in this game. This final wage does not
have to depend in any way on the wage offer made previously. Figure 1 describes
the sequential structure of the two games. In both games the payoff functions
are piEmployer = 50 wage + 20 · effort and piWorker = 50 + wage (6 + 4 ·
effort), whereas the wage is the wage offer in the GEG and the final wage in the
WPG.
The two games allow us to study trust and reciprocity of our participants.
Employers will only make high wage offers in the GEG if they trust workers to
send efforts in return and workers will return high efforts in the GEG if they are
reciprocal. In the WPG the wage offer is (strategically) just cheap talk; high
efforts will only be chosen by workers that trust in employers to return high
final wages; and high final wages in reaction to high effort show that employers
are behaving reciprocal. Using the two games also allows us to determine what
drives trusting decisions, which are influenced by pro-social attitudes as well
as by beliefs about the likelihood of the counterpart to reciprocate. This risky
element is present for employers in the GEG wage offer, but not in the WPG
wage decisions. Hence, comparing between the games allows us to get an idea
about whether it is the risk or the reciprocal element of decisions that explains
differences based on gender or academic major. Similarly, for worker decisions
efforts returned are based on reciprocity motives in the GEG, while being risky in
the WPG, Comparisons of decisions across the two different games can therefore
provide interesting insights in our setting.
The experiment was implemented in a computer laboratory using z-tree (Fis-
chbacher, 2007) with university students as participants. For the games we used
a labour market framing, describing the roles of participants as employers and
workers, and decisions as wage offers, efforts and final wages, although all choices
were coded into number values. Upon arrival in the laboratory participants were
randomly assigned the role of either a worker or an employer and remained in
that role throughout the experiment. The experiment included 8 rounds of the
2For example, Fehr et al. (2007) use experiments in which bonuses can be paid to workers.
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Figure 1: Sequential structure of the GEG and the WPG
GEG and 8 rounds of the WPG; the order of which game was played first was
randomly changed between sessions in order to be able to control potential order
effects. In our analysis below we did not find any order effects for any decision
variable (regressions available from the authors upon request). Participants re-
ceived instructions for each game just before the first round of the respective
game, i.e., before rounds 1 and 9, respectively. Employer-worker pairs were ran-
domly rematched each round (stranger matching). At the end of the experiment
2 rounds of each game were chosen randomly for payment (random incentive
mechanism) to avoid wealth effects, while keeping the probability of a single
round to be paid at 25%, i.e. it is reasonable likely that a single round is payoff
relevant. At the end of the experiment experimental dollars were transformed
to Chinese Yuan at a rate of 50 experimental dollars = 1 Yuan, which had been
announced at the beginning of the experiment; this allowed participants to earn
between 3 and 12 Yuan (on average around 8 Yuan) for about one hour of par-
ticipation in the experiment, which compares to 7 to 8 Yuan paid per hour for
other student work opportunities on campus. The experiment was also followed
by a short experimental questionnaire, asking students for their gender, age,
and other personal and demographic information, as well as their job market
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experience, job attitudes and origin within China, income and expenditures,
and their trusting attitudes.
The experiment was run with a total of 216 participants (60% male, average
age 20.63 years), which composed of 112 students in economics-based majors
and 104 studying in technical or engineering related majors. Participants inter-
acted in sessions with other students that had similar majors than themselves.
However, participants were not informed about this or any other characteristic
of their counterpart; hence, all comparisons described in the following are based
on covariate analysis of decisions collected in the post-experimental question-
naire.
4 Experimental results
In our experiment participants made decisions in different roles, employers and
workers, and played in two different games, the GEG and the WPG. Decision
patterns are therefore different based on the role taken and the game played.
Figure 2 shows the average decisions based the games. In the GEG wage offers
are lower, but realised (final) wages are higher than in the WPG (t-tests show
that all these differences are statistically significant), although efforts are higher
in the WPG.3 This indicates that (as common in many other experiments)
reciprocal patterns can be observed, but that the player with the last move
tends to allocate more to him or herself than the other player would have done.
Figure 2: Average decision variables for employers and workers
(a) Average employer decisions
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We examined determinants of decisions for both employers and workers in
our experiment and separated by decision variables. In the following analysis
figures and simple t-tests are used to describe general tendencies and regressions
were used to introduce more controls and have more robust results. Results pre-
sented in the following were also scrutinised for game order effects (which we
3Differences in average wage offers in the GEG and realised wages come from the possibility
of workers to decline wage offers.
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did not find), as well as including further controls (e.g. the student’s origin
within China) and performing further robustness checks on the functional spec-
ification of the analysis (for example using tobit models instead of the ordinary
least squares (OLS) models used in the following). Furthermore, OLS regres-
sions used standard errors clustered by individual (qualitative results are the
same when using clustering by session instead). We did not find any qualitative
changes based on any alternative specification and hence report OLS results in
the following.
4.1 Determinants of employer decisions
Figures 3a and 3b show employer decisions based on the game played and sep-
arated by gender as well as academic major. As can be seen in these figures,
the level of decisions (that is, transfers) appears to be less for females and for
students in economics-related degrees. Using t-tests over all periods of a game
these differences are significant for all decision variables, except for differences
between wage offers by academic major in the WPG. However, given the differ-
ences in gender composition between the two academic majors and the potential
influence of other variables, we introduce more covariates in the following re-
gression analysis.
Figure 3: Average decision variables for employers
(a) Average employer decisions by gender
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Table 1 shows OLS estimation results of employer decisions, and reports the
effects of (potential) determinants of the three choice variables, i.e. binding
wage offers in the GEG, non-binding wage offers in the WPG and final wages
in the WPG. Candidates for determinants of decisions are academic major,
gender, age, employment status and income. Furthermore, a time control is
included to reflect potential developments over the duration of the game.4 The
variables included in the regression do not necessarily have the same influence
4Another experiment-inherent dynamic are game order effects. However, as game order
was not statistically significant in any regression (neither for employer nor worker decisions),
it is not further reported in the following analysis.
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on the three decision variables. There is no statistically significant effect of
academic major on any of the decision variables and in neither of the games.
With regard to gender, there is evidence that female students are less trusting
than male students in the GEG, as they make significantly less generous wage
offers to workers. With females in the employer, role wage offers are lower
by 27% ( 1657 given the average wage offer of 57), an also economically large
difference. This indicates that females as employers are less trusting. Comparing
employer decisions across games indicates that risk attitudes might drive lower
trust, as females’ lower level of wage offers and final wages is mediated once the
risky element is removed from the trusting decision and the wage paid can be
determined after observing the effort in the WPG.
Table 1: Determinants of employer decisions
Wage offer Wage offer Final wage
(GEG) (WPG) (WPG)
Econ./Business student -4.753 6.525 -2.502
(6.640) (5.365) (5.766)
Female -15.690** -4.418 -8.754
(6.374) (4.843) (5.509)
Age -4.877** -4.991** 0.785
(2.155) (2.082) (1.998)
Currently employed 17.885*** 0.726 13.093***
(5.682) (4.427) (4.629)
Income 0.008** -0.002 0.003
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Period -1.600*** 2.619*** -0.333
(0.554) (0.404) (0.535)
Wage offer -0.035
(0.098)
Effort 6.846***
(0.653)
N 784 784 614
R2 0.16 0.12 0.32
The table shows OLS regression results of employer decisions on
potential determinants. *** indicates significance at the 1% level,
** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level; standard errors are
clustered by individual.
Besides gender, there are also other significant determinants of employer de-
cisions. The results indicate that older students are significantly less trusting
towards workers than younger students. This is observable in the wage offer
decision both in the GEG and the WPG. However, the effect disappears in the
final wage decision of the WPG, which indicates that lower trust in workers
rather than lower reciprocity drives the difference. While older subjects appear
to be less trusting in our experiment, job market experience, reflected in own
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employment, has a significantly positive effect on wages paid, both for wage
offers made in the GEG as well as final wages in the WPG, while the effect is
insignificant for the wage offer in the WPG.5 Again, the fact of being employed
oneself and hence having workplace experience leads to a statistically and eco-
nomically strong effect in both games and indicates that current employment
and hence job experience actually increases reciprocal behaviour in our experi-
mental labour market.6 We also include income as a potential control variable in
the regressions. The estimation shows that income has a significant positive ef-
fect on wage offers in the GEG, but not on other decision variables of employers.
The size of the income coefficient (0.008) is noticeable (given that the standard
deviation of income is 506). As parental transfers are the major source of income
for most students, this indicates that students from higher-income families are
more trusting.
Finally, we also include game-inherent controls in our regression analysis.
There appears to be a decline in trusting attitudes over time in the GEG. This
is surprising when considering that the analysis of worker decisions indicates
that (in an expectations-based equilibrium) it would be profitable for employers
to increase their wage offers.7 On the contrary in the WPG there is a positive
time trend for wage offers, which indicates that employers increasingly make
use of the positive effect that the (costless and cheap talk) wage offer has on
worker decisions. For the last employer decision variable, final wages, there is no
significant time trend observable; for this decision two other factors, wage offers
and received efforts are included due to their potential importance. As can be
seen in the last column of Table 1, wage offers were just cheap talk, having no
influence on the final wage decision. However, employers positively reciprocate
the efforts by workers by more than workers’ extra cost of effort.8
4.2 Determinants of worker decisions
As for workers, we first made simple comparisons of worker decisions based on
gender and academic major. Figures 4a and 4b show an overview of these com-
parisons, indicating that efforts by female workers and by students in economics-
related degrees were lower in both games. Again, using simple t-tests over all
periods show that these differences are statistically significant. For the same
reason as for employer decisions we introduced more controls in the follow-
ing regression analysis in order to obtain more robust results and read these
overviews with caution.
Table 2 shows OLS estimation results of potential determinants on efforts
5We also tested whether age and job status are counteracting effects. However, they appear
to be independent and (qualitatively and quantitatively) remain when dropping either variable
from the regression.
6As such, our results align with the findings of Hannan et al. (2002) who compare the
decisions of undergraduates and (job-experienced) MBA students.
7Increasing the wage offer by one unit has an effect of ∆piEmployer = -1+0.07·20 = 0.4
given the coefficient on wage offers by workers (see Table 2).
8One extra unit of effort reduces worker payoff by 4 experimental dollars, but is reciprocated
with 6.8 experimental dollars by employers.
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Figure 4: Average decision variables for workers
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chosen by participants in the worker role. One first observation from this anal-
ysis is that workers respond positively to wage offers and that the level of their
reaction is high in both games. The coefficient on wage offers implies that it
would even be profitable for employers to further increase their offers given the
responsiveness of workers to these offers. Furthermore, and somewhat surpris-
ingly, workers react to wage offers in almost the same way in the two games,
despite the fact that in the GEG wage offers are binding while they are just
cheap talk in the WPG.
We considered the same determinants of decisions for workers as we did for
employers. Again we did not find any significant difference in decisions based on
academic major. This observation was true both for the decision to reciprocate
binding wage offers in the GEG as well as for the decision to trust employers by
providing effort in the WPG. With regard to the effect of gender we find that
females are less reciprocal in the GEG, while there is no significant difference
based on gender in the WPG. This result is somewhat divergent to the finding
based on gender in the employer role, as it indicates that female workers were
significantly less reciprocal, but not significantly less trusting, although in both
roles the directional effect was the same (and the same as for employer decisions).
Controls for age and employment status do not significantly affect decisions
for individuals in the worker role. Furthermore, higher income leads individuals
to be less trusting in the WPG, while there is no significant difference in the
GEG, the first of which is contrary to the finding in the analysis of employer
choices. Finally, there is again a significant time trend, indicating that workers
are increasingly reciprocal in the GEG, but become less trusting over time in
the WPG, which is roughly in line with the time trends observable for employer
decisions.9
9Again, however, and similar to participants in the employer role, workers underestimate
the positive reciprocal effect of employer decisions, which would indicate that they should
further increase their level of effort in the WPG.
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Table 2: Determinants of worker decisions
Effort Effort
(GEG) (WPG)
Wage offer 0.072*** 0.070***
(0.004) (0.005)
Econ./Business student -0.511 0.154
(0.381) (0.502)
Female -0.702** -0.593
(0.345) (0.514)
Age -0.010 -0.070
(0.123) (0.168)
Currently employed -0.340 -0.625
(0.769) (0.627)
Income -0.000 -0.002**
(0.000) (0.001)
Period 0.103*** -0.148***
(0.032) (0.046)
N 792 792
R2 0.60 0.28
The table shows OLS regression results of worker decisions on
potential determinants. *** indicates significance at the 1% level,
** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level; standard errors are
clustered by individual.
4.3 Overall implications
Overall, these results yield a number of interesting insights for our subject pool.
In line with the literature, we observe reciprocity in both games, while pure
own payoff-maximizing motives seem to have only a limited, second-order effect
(participants, when making the last decision in a given round, tend to allocate
a larger share of the surplus to themselves a result which is in line with the
literature).
Compared to the GEG the strategic meaning of the wage offer changes in
the WPG and becomes a cheap talk promise. Employers use the opportunity to
make a promise, but do not feel committed to this promise (the coefficient on
the wage offer in the WPG is far from significant). Instead the final wage paid in
the WPG is only determined by workers’ effort. However, workers react to the
non-binding wage offer (on average) almost as strongly as to the binding wage
offer. This indicates that workers overestimate the value of the non-binding
wage offers they receive.
With regard to the (individual-based) determinants of trusting behaviour
in our games, we find that academic major does not play a significant role for
our Chinese subject pool once the gender effect is taken into account. This
is the case for both games and both roles, i.e. workers and employers. We
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find a significant gender effect for decisions in the GEG. However, the effect
was not significant in the WPG. The comparison across the games based on
decisions in the employer role indicates that females were less trusting in their
wage offer and that this might be due to risk attitudes. However, the same
comparison between the two games looking at worker decisions implies that
females are less reciprocal, as they return significantly less than males in the
GEG, but do not provide significantly different efforts when facing uncertainty
about the final wage paid by employers. It can be seen that the tendency of
females to be less cooperative was not significant in either role in the WPG,
although the sign of the female variable remained the in the same direction as
in the GEG. This leaves a somewhat mixed picture, in which risk and lower
reciprocity might have an influence for our subject pool, while lower reciprocity
could be a slightly greater driver of differences than risk attitudes.10 While
explaining this difference is somewhat speculative given our data, these findings
are in line with the general picture in the literature describing women to be
more reactive to the game-context and framing used in the two games; that is,
in the WPG women might be able to use the cheap talk wage promising stage
as a vehicle to make interaction more collaborative and to embark on a more
cooperative path.
With respect to the other potential determinants used in our study, the pic-
ture is similar to that in the literature. Age appears to lead to less generous
wage offers, but not to significantly lower levels of reciprocity, as the age effect
disappears for decisions over final wages and is also not observable for worker
decisions. A similarly mixed determinant is job experience, which leads par-
ticipants in the employer role to offer more and the person in the worker role
to react with insignificantly lower efforts.11 Finally, income has a significant
effect for some decisions, but not for others, which makes it difficult to give it
a clear-cut interpretation and we refrain from speculating about the reason for
any effect here.
Finally, we observe time trends of almost all variables over the course of the
games. For wage offers in the GEG the time trend indicates declining reciprocity,
which is surprising as higher wage offers in the game would be profitable for
10For example, females also pay significantly lower final wages in the WPG; this difference is
due to the interplay of (insignificantly) lower wage offers of females, which lead to slightly lower
returned efforts to them. These efforts are in the next stage reciprocated (insignificantly) less
by females, jointly leading to a significant difference. We have not included these estimation
results above, as we believe that it is important to take the influence of received efforts into
account when analysing final wage decisions. Nevertheless, this gives another indication about
what might drive the lower levels of choices by females.
11Two interpretations can be used to explain this. One is that job experience leads to the
perception that higher reciprocity is reasonable and mutually profitable in employer-worker
interaction (e.g. Hannan et al. (2002) argued that MBA students that had experience in jobs
in which gift exchange actually occurred were more likely to engage into gift exchange in their
experiment). However, in this case one would in our experiment expect a similar effect for
individuals with job experience in the worker role, but this is not observable. Another expla-
nation could be a higher level of identification with the worker role and hence higher transfers
to the participant in this role. This is particularly plausible considering that participants that
currently have a job are in the worker role in reality.
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employers given the reaction pattern of workers, and additionally workers also
return significantly higher amounts in later periods of the GEG. Conversely,
there is a positive trend for wage offers in the WPG, probably reflecting that
employers increasingly realise that wage offers are having a positive effect on
worker decisions despite being costless cheap talk to themselves. However, for
worker decisions in the WPG the time trend is negative, most likely reflecting
that workers realise that wage offers in the WPG are just cheap talk and not
indicative of final wages.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we studied determinants of decisions in an experimental labour
market in a student population in China. We found that most however, not
all findings of the literature about experimental decisions are also found in our
Chinese participant pool. That is, we did not replicate findings of differences
in decisions based on academic major, indicating that the Chinese students
studying in an economics-related major are not necessarily more selfish than
others. We did, however, find that females were less trusting than males in GEG
decisions, with its direction but also with its context-dependant significance
being similar to findings in the West (see Croson and Gneezy, 2009) as well as
in China (Wang and Yamagishi, 2005). However, our finding of less reciprocity
in female decisions in the GEG adds another facet to the literature. We did not
find a clear indication for the common conjecture that lower trust by females
is driven by risk aversion. This would have become apparent comparing results
from the GEG and the WPG where the risk is shifted from the employer to the
worker. Instead our results indicate that the differences in female decisions are
potentially influenced by both risk attitudes and lower reciprocity.
With regard to our other findings only our strong age effect is surprising, as
it indicates that social preferences might even change with age over a relatively
short time span and not only between cohorts. The influence of the other
variables is difficult to interpret given their varying statistical significance (job
status) and changing sign (income).
We believe that our results provide some first important insights about de-
terminants of (labour market relevant) social preferences in China. Particu-
larly the study of gender differences in labour market interaction appears to
be an interesting and important avenue for future experimental economic re-
search, as China continues to become the world’s economic powerhouse, while
its demographic structure is changing and will increasingly (have to) draw on
an educated male and female workforce. Understanding the behaviour of this
workforce, which is potentially different in its way of interaction from a Western
workforce (due to major societal changes in recent years, including the effects
of the “one child” policy), is therefore important and deserves a closer look.
Our paper is one step towards such a better understanding. As such, we believe
that our results can deliver valuable insights for understanding determinants of
pro-social behaviour relevant in labour market contexts in China and be infor-
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mative for policy makers regulating labour markets as well as managers trying to
implement organisational models developed in the West to Chinese companies.
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